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Abstract 
 
This paper is drawn from a study commissioned by the DTI, the purpose of which was to 
investigate the views of the directors of private limited companies that are likely to 
qualify as small if the higher EU thresholds are adopted in the UK.  The paper focuses on 
the factors that have a significant influence on the directors’ decision to have a voluntary 
audit if the company were exempt from the statutory requirement. 
 
Following exploratory interviews, a postal questionnaire was sent to the principal 
directors of all independent private limited companies that had filed full accounts in 2002 
and which fell within the EU maxima for a small company.  At the time of the study, 
these were turnover £4.8m, balance sheet total £2.4m and employees 50.  Usable replies 
were received from 790 companies, giving a response rate of 30%.  Tests for non-
response bias indicated that the sample was representative of the body of companies from 
which it was drawn in respect of turnover and balance sheet total, but that it did not 
represent the smallest companies in terms of number of employees. 
 
The proposal to raise the audit exemption threshold to £4.8m was supported by 57% of 
the sample companies.  However, 42% of companies with a maximum turnover of £1m 
(the current threshold) had chosen a voluntary audit in their 2002 accounts and 42% of 
companies with a maximum turnover of £4.8m predicted that they would have a 
voluntary audit if they became exempt.  Logistic regression analysis reveals that the 
likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit is higher if the company is larger in 
terms of turnover and they consider the audit provides a check on accounting records and 
systems, improves the quality of the financial information and has a positive effect on the 
company’s credit rating score; in addition, if the company is not wholly family-owned, 
has shareholders without access to internal financial information and if the statutory 
accounts are normally given to the bank and other providers of finance. 
 
These results suggest that if thresholds in the UK are raised to EU levels, policy-makers 
should be aware that the new category of small companies would contain two subgroups 
with differing needs.  This is demonstrated by the significant proportion of directors 
whose audit decision indicates that the benefits outweigh the costs.  This heterogeneity 
should also be taken into account by those who contribute to the development of 
differential financial reporting on the basis of size at the international level. 
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1. Background to the study 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This study is based on a survey commissioned by the DTI (Collis, 2003a) and supports 
the government’s stance on evidence-based policymaking (Cabinet Office, 1999).  The 
purpose of the research was to investigate the views of the directors of small private 
companies as part of the UK government’s consultation on raising the audit exemption 
level.  The study was designed to extend previous research (Collis and Jarvis, 2000, 
Collis, Jarvis and Skerratt, 2001b; Collis, 2003b) and focuses on companies that were 
likely to qualify as ‘small’ under UK law already, as well as those that were likely to be 
reclassified as such if the higher EU thresholds were adopted.  This paper examines the 
factors that have a significant influence on the directors’ decision regarding a voluntary 
audit if the company were exempt. 
 
The question of the size of company that should be exempt from the statutory audit is an 
important aspect of a wider debate on the need for different sets of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) for large and small entities (the big GAAP/little GAAP 
debate).  Although the appropriate threshold for audit exemption is controversial, the 
discussion has been dominated by anecdotal evidence from policy-makers and the 
accountancy profession.  Since the directors are the main users of the statutory accounts 
(Page, 1984; Carsberg, Page, Sindall and Waring, 1985; Barker and Noonan, 1996) and 
recent research shows that they use the accounts for a range of internal and external 
purposes (Collis and Jarvis, 2000), their views are vital.  Moreover, they must weigh up 
the costs and benefits of having the accounts audited, and bear the financial cost of the 
audit. 
 
1.2 Role of the audit 
 
An audit is ‘an independent examination of, and the subsequent expression of opinion on, 
the financial statements of an organization’ (Hussey, 1999, p. 33).  The audit can be 
viewed as an integral part of corporate financial reporting, where the assurance it provides 
stems from the trust placed in the judgement of the auditor.  The audit is designed to 
demonstrate ‘the completeness, accuracy and validity of transactions which, when 
aggregated, make up the financial statements’ (Power, 1997, p. 24). 
 
The auditor must plan the audit to provide a reasonable expectation of detecting material 
misstatements (APC, 1990).  Some contend that responsibility for the prevention of fraud 
rests with management, through internal systems of supervision and control (Pound and 
Courtis, 1980), but Woolf (1996) argues that there is some overlap, as material fraud is 
likely to affect the true and fair view verified by the auditor. 
 
1.3 Development of differential audit requirements 
 
In the UK, differential financial reporting for companies of different sizes developed in 
the early 1990s, when smaller companies were offered a regulatory framework with some 
simplifications and concessions from generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  
The regulatory framework for smaller reporting entities has become known as little 
GAAP. 
 3 
 
In 1994 the EC Fourth Company Law Directive permitted national governments to 
dispense with the requirement for smaller entities to undergo an audit.  This led to an 
amendment of section 249A of the Companies Act 1985 (SI 1994/1935) to exempt 
qualifying small companies with a turnover up to £90,000 and a balance sheet total up to 
£1.4m.  It is important to note that this turnover threshold was lower than the level set in 
the Fourth Directive.  Unless a full audit was required by at least 10% of shareholders, a 
company with a turnover of between £90,000 and £350,000 was able to dispense with the 
audit, but had to have an accountant’s report.  In 1997 the turnover threshold was raised 
to £350,000 (SI 1997/936), with the balance sheet total remaining at £1.4m.  However, 
the company also had to qualify as ‘small’ for the purpose of filing abbreviated accounts.1  
 
In 2000 the turnover threshold was increased to £1m (SI 2000/1430) and the government 
put forward a proposal to raise the small company
2
 size thresholds, including audit 
exemption, to the EU levels shown in Table 1 (DTI, 2000).
3
  Under sections 247 and 
247A of the Companies Act 1985, apart from certain companies that are excluded for 
reasons of public interest, a company qualifies as small if it meets any two of three basic 
size tests shown under UK maxima in Table 1.  Apart from a newly incorporated 
company, the conditions must have been satisfied in two of the last three years (similar 
conditions apply to small groups).  Table 1 also shows the higher EU thresholds. 
 
Table 1 Size criteria and thresholds for small entities 
 
Criteria UK maxima 
at the time of 
the study 
EU maxima 
at the time of 
the study 
EU maxima 
from 
May 2003 
Turnover £2.8m £4.8m £5.6m 
Balance sheet total £1.4m £2.4m £2.8m 
Employees 50 50 50 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the paper 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews the empirical and 
anecdotal evidence on the issue of audit exemption, which provides the theoretical 
framework for the study.  Section 3 describes the methodology, which paves the way for 
an examination of the results in Section 4.  The final section draws conclusions and 
discusses the implications of the findings.  
 
 
                                               
1 The options set out in Section 246 of the Companies Act (as revised by SI 1997/220) allow small and 
medium-sized companies to prepare and file either full or abbreviated financial statements with the 
Registrar, but they must provide full financial statements for their shareholders.  Abbreviated accounts must 
be accompanied by a special auditors’ report, unless the company is exempt from the requirement for an 
audit by virtue of sections 249A(1) or (2) or 250 of the Companies Act 1985.  
2 Most of the requirements of company law also apply to limited liability partnerships, a new form of 
business vehicle permitted since April 2001. 
3 In most EU member states the threshold is higher than in the UK (typically, £2m-£4m), but there are also 
legal and regulatory differences, as well as variations in the population and size distribution of business 
entities.  These factors make inter-country comparisons problematic. 
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2. Review of the literature 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Differentiation in the size of company that should be required to have an audit implies 
that at a certain size the benefits outweigh the costs. Thus, the rationale for audit 
exemption is to relieve the unnecessary cost burden that the government argues falls 
disproportionately on small companies (DTI, 1995; DTI, 1999).  However, the proposal 
to raise the size thresholds to the EU maxima has resulted in controversy over who will 
gain from such a move. 
 
From the regulators’ perspective, and that of the accountancy profession, the lack of 
information on the exact nature of the costs and benefits has limited the debate on the 
appropriate level for audit exemption (Collis, Jarvis and Skerratt, 2001a).  Discussions 
have been informed mainly by anecdotal evidence, together with a small number of 
research studies.  Given the dynamic nature of the regulatory environment in which 
financial reporting takes place, the results of older studies often have little relevance.  
Moreover, much of the previous research has is based on too small a sample to permit 
generalisations to be made (for example, Page, 1984; Freedman and Goodwin, 1993; 
Pratten, 1998; Lin-Seouw, 2001). 
 
Recent generalisable evidence on the net benefits of the audit comes from a study by 
Collis (2003b), which gave rise to publications by Collis and Jarvis (2000); Collis et al., 
2001a and 2001b, and forthcoming).  The following literature review draws on this prior 
work. 
 
2.2 Size factors 
 
An examination of the evidence relating to take-up levels offers key information relating 
to size as a factor for influencing the balance between the costs and benefits of the small 
company audit.  A study of 171 companies,
4
 conducted in 1979 before the Companies Act 
1981 introduced a three-tier size classification of companies, predicted that only 15% of 
companies would discontinue the audit, whilst 84% would continue to have their accounts 
audited (Page, 1984).  However, the sample was not selected on the basis of any size 
criteria but across the range of active, independent companies.  This, together with the 
passage of time before audit exemption was first introduced in 1994, makes comparison 
problematic. 
 
Details of the actual number of companies that took advantage of exemption in the early 
years are not available, but the government has recently begun collecting statistics.  These 
show that 14% of companies on the register in 2002/3 had filed full audited accounts, 9% 
had filed abbreviated accounts and 57% had filed full or abbreviated accounts that were 
audit exempt (DTI, 2003, Table F2, p. 58).  The remainder had filed group accounts, 
interim/initial accounts or were dormant.  This information is difficult to interpret, as the 
percentages relate to the total business stock, rather than those eligible for exemption. 
 
                                               
4 This study achieved a 41% response rate from 413 companies. 
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A MORI survey of 176 companies on behalf of the ACCA (1998) forecast that 
approximately 40% of companies with a turnover between £350,000 and £1.5m were 
likely to opt for audit exemption if the threshold were raised to £1.5m.  Looking at 
companies with a turnover up to £4.2m, a survey of the directors of 385 private limited 
companies (Collis and Jarvis, 2000)
5
 found that 29% would forgo the audit if they had a 
choice, whilst 63% would have a voluntary audit if the threshold were raised to £4.2m 
(the EU maximum at that time).  Thus, the predictions of both studies suggest that the 
majority of smaller companies consider the benefits outweigh the costs. 
 
The profession’s views on the most appropriate level for audit exemption are diverse (see 
for example, Acher, 1999; Graham, 1999; Langard, 1999; Masters, 1999).  Among those 
in favour of raising the turnover threshold, Mitchell (1999, p. 21) reported that ‘92% of 
accountants responding to a Small Practitioners Association survey supported exemption 
for all private, owner-managed, small limited companies’.  The ICAEW described the 
news that the threshold could be raised to the EU maximum as ‘a positive step to ease the 
burdens on business’ (Accountancy, 2003, p. 9).  On the other hand, others in the ICAEW 
argued that raising the audit threshold reduces the quality of the information put on public 
record (Jones, 2003).  The ACCA supported maintaining the present limit: ‘The 
inescapable fact is that the government’s proposals advocate the removal of the audit but 
not the requirement for the directors to deliver true and fair annual financial statements.  
Since 90% of the work is done by accountants in the compliance function, it is foolish to 
take away the value-added aspect which comes with the audit’ (Beckerlegge, 1999, p.21).  
In the wake of Enron, the chief executive of ACCA argues that raising the audit threshold 
will raise the risk of fraud (Rose, 2003). 
 
2.3 Management factors 
 
In addition to size and external agency relationships, the demand for the audit may be 
attributable to management factors.  Management may want an independent check on 
internal controls to reduce the chance of material error.  In small companies inherent risk 
(the likelihood of a material misstatement arising) and control risk (the likelihood of the 
accounting control detecting any material misstatement) may be high.  Indeed, Collis et 
al. (2001b) found that directors who would have a voluntary audit if they became exempt 
are likely to hold the view that the audit increases the quality of the information in the 
accounts and acts as a check on internal books and records. 
 
Although Carsberg et al. (1985) established that the main use of the statutory accounts is 
for management purposes (particularly confirmatory purposes) their study did not explore 
the specific role of the audit in this connection. The MORI survey (ACCA, 1998) found 
that 40% of small companies consider that information provided by the audit is useful to 
the business itself, which suggests that the directors have a general perception that the 
audit provides net benefits.  Page (1984) suggests that the directors would choose to have 
a voluntary audit for the efficient running of the company.  Responses from 10 companies 
in a questionnaire survey by Pratten (1998) suggest several other reasons: 
 
 their accountant had advised it; 
 it is a discipline/good practice; 
 for continuity with the past; 
                                               
5 The study achieved a 17% response rate from 2,287 companies. 
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 for a profit-related pay scheme. 
 
Collis et al. (2001b) found that directors who had a degree, professional/vocational 
qualification or who had studied/trained in business or management subjects were more 
likely to choose a voluntary audit.  This suggests that educational profile may be a proxy 
for formal knowledge of the costs and benefits of the audit. 
 
2.4 Agency factors 
 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) offers another factor that might influence the 
balance between the costs and benefits of the audit.  The theory suggests that information 
asymmetry arises in companies where there is separation of ownership and control, and 
this leads to the demand for the accounts to be audited.  The agency rationale is 
classically applied in large companies where there are external shareholders and the 
audited accounts play an agency role in the relationship between shareholder (the 
principal) and director (the agent).  In small companies, a principal is anyone who is 
distant from the actions of management and is unable to verify them, such as external 
shareholders, lenders and creditors. 
 
Previous research shows that the audited accounts of small firms are crucial to the banks 
for making lending decisions
6
 (Berry, Citron and Jarvis, 1987; Berry, Crum and Waring, 
1993; Berry, Faulkner, Hughes and Jarvis, 1993; Deakins and Hussain, 1994; ACCA, 
1998).   There is also evidence that this is one reason why the directors choose to have the 
accounts audited (Page, 1984; Lin-Seouw, 2001).  Indeed, a telephone survey of 176 
companies with a turnover of up to £1.5m found that 82% consider that the information 
provided within the statutory audit is useful to the bank (ACCA, 1998, Appendix, p. 3). 
 
Information asymmetry may also be present amongst internal shareholders if they lack the 
necessary skills to interpret financial information (Power, 1997).  Thus, demand for the 
audit from shareholders may not be dependent on size, since ‘even in the very smallest 
company disputes can arise between shareholders and the audited accounts can be an 
essential protection’ (Freedman and Goodwin, 1993, p. 128).  Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that as most small companies are owner-managed and family-owned (Bolton, 
1971; Poutziouris, Chittenden, and Michaelas, 1998; Collis and Jarvis, 2000), there is 
little value in having the accounts audited and this agency cost can be avoided if the 
company is eligible for exemption. 
 
Simunic and Stein (1987) contend that agency costs increase in proportion to the size and 
complexity of the firm’s operations.  Therefore, such costs are expected to be less 
significant in small firms where operations are less complex than in large firms.  Keasey, 
Watson and Wynarczyk (1988) argue that the cost of the universal application of the 
requirement to have the accounts audited falls disproportionately on small companies, 
particularly if the accounts are of little use to external users.  This seems logical, as the 
proportion of fixed costs to variable costs is likely to be greater in small firms compared 
to large firms (Collis et al., 2001b). 
 
                                               
6 Banks are the main source of finance to small firms (Cosh and Hughes, 1998). 
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2.5 Purpose of the study 
 
The study builds on previous work by the author, which suffers from two limitations.  
First, due to the nature of the sampling frame, it was not representative of companies with 
a turnover of less than £0.5m; and second, the regulatory environment has changed since 
it was conducted in 1999.  The purpose of the research was to address these deficiencies 
by investigating the views of the directors of private limited companies that are likely to 
qualify as small under UK law, as well as those that are likely to be reclassified as such if 
the higher EU thresholds were adopted. 
 
The paper addresses the following research question: 
 
What are the factors that have a significant influence on the demand for 
the audit among companies with a maximum turnover of £4.8m?
7
 
 
This is divided into nine hypotheses, which are presented below in the alternate form.  
The first hypothesis is based on the importance of turnover in the size qualification 
criteria in the Companies Act 1985: 
 
H1 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with size, as measured by turnover. 
 
The next five hypotheses relate to management factors in connection with the directors’ 
knowledge or beliefs about the costs and benefits of the audit: 
 
H2 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with perceptions that the audit provides a check on 
accounting records and systems. 
H3 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with perceptions that the audit improves the quality of 
the financial information. 
H4 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with perceptions that the audit improves the credibility 
of the financial information. 
H5 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with perceptions that the audit has a positive effect on 
the company’s credit rating score. 
H6 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases if they have a degree, a professional/vocational 
qualification or have studied/trained in business or management 
subjects. 
 
The last three hypotheses relate to agency factors: 
 
H7 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases if they are not wholly family owned. 
                                               
7 This was the EU maximum in March 2003, when the survey was conducted. 
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H8 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases if they have external shareholders without access to 
internal financial information. 
H9 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases if they give a copy of their statutory accounts to the 
bank and other providers of finance. 
 
These theoretical propositions will be tested using logistic regression, which is a 
technique for predicting an outcome (the dependent variable) from a number of predictor 
variables (the independent variables) using multiple regression.  The general model for 
the analysis is: 
 
Voluntary audit decision = f (size, perceptions of audit costs and benefits, agency costs) 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
The study was designed as a postal questionnaire survey of the directors of unlisted, 
private limited companies across all industries and regions in the UK.  In March 2003, a 
list of private limited companies that had filed full accounts for 2002 was drawn from 
FAME
8
 across all industries and regions of Great Britain.  As a proxy for qualifying as a 
small company under EU maxima in force at the time of the study, selection was made on 
the basis of the company meeting all three of the following criteria in their 2002 accounts: 
  
 turnover not exceeding £4.8m; 
 balance sheet total not exceeding £2.4m; 
 up to 50 employees. 
 
This resulted in a list of 3,202 companies that represented the population of companies of 
this size filing full accounts last year.
9
  The schedule was then screened to remove 
dormant companies, subsidiaries, groups and holding companies in order to retain only 
active independent companies, where financial reporting decisions would not be 
influenced by group policies.  Finally, companies that had not provided any named 
director were eliminated to improve the response rate. 
 
The questionnaire (see Appendix) was developed and piloted by conducting three 
interviews with auditors with small company clients and five with directors of small 
companies.  The questionnaire was then reviewed by a number of experienced researchers 
before being posted to a named director, together with an accompanying letter and 
prepaid envelope in April 2003.  In order to increase the response rate, a reminder was 
sent in May enclosing another copy of the questionnaire and prepaid envelope, as 
suggested by Kervin (1992).  A further group of companies was eliminated from the 
                                               
8 A database that contains up to 10 years’ information on British companies registered at Companies House 
one month after the accounts are filed, including more than 2.3m private companies. 
9 Companies filing abbreviated accounts do not disclose all three figures and, therefore, were not 
represented in the sample. 
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initial list because information was received that they had ceased trading, moved away or 
because the owner was absent/unable to participate.  This reduced the list to 2,633 
companies.  By the cut-off date of 28
th
 May, 790 usable replies had been received, giving 
a response rate of 30%. 
 
In addition to the survey data, some financial and demographic data was obtained from 
FAME.  Answers to open questions in the questionnaire were categorised thematically 
and the frequencies recorded.  The data was analysed statistically using SPSS. 
 
3.3 Response rate 
 
It has already been mentioned that the exact number of companies that qualify as small is 
not known, as there is no sampling frame that defines companies according to the 
Companies Act criteria.  However, using the category 0 – 50 employees as a proxy, 
government statistics show that the population of small companies totals 830,990 (SBS, 
2002).  The size of the sample (790) is sufficient to represent the population, as it greatly 
exceeds the minimum acceptable sample size of 384 for a population of this size (Krejcie 
and Morgan, 1970, p. 608). 
 
Tests for non-response bias found that non-respondents were likely to have been smaller 
in terms of number of employees.  This indicates that the sample contained fewer 
companies with no employees or very few employees compared with the population.  
However, in terms of turnover and balance sheet total, the results showed that the sample 
was representative of the body of companies from which it was drawn. 
 
3.4 The sample companies 
 
The intention of the study was to capture the views of the directors and in 94% of cases 
the questionnaire was answered by the principal director, finance director or company 
secretary.  The position and the educational profiles of the respondents suggested they 
would have both tacit and formal knowledge with which to answer the questions and 
weigh up the costs and benefits of the audit when making the audit decision. 
 
As in the wider population, the majority of the sample companies were at the smaller end 
of scale in terms of ownership and size. The vast majority (90%) had between one and 
four shareholders.  In terms of size, 80% had a maximum turnover of £1m in their 2002 
accounts, 89% had a maximum balance sheet total of £1.4m, and 78% had between 0 and 
10 employees. 
 
3.5 Variables in the analysis 
 
Table 2 summarises the variables in the analysis. 
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Table 2 Demand for a voluntary audit: Variables in the analysis 
 
Label Description Expected 
sign 
Hypothesis 
tested 
VOLAUDIT Whether the company would have a voluntary 
audit 
Dependent variable 
TOVER Turnover in 2002 accounts Positive H1 
CHECK Extent of agreement that the audit provides a 
check on accounting records and systems 
Positive H2 
QUALITY Extent of agreement that the audit improves the 
quality of the financial information 
Positive H3 
CREDIBLY Extent of agreement that the audit improves the 
credibility of the financial information 
Positive H4 
CREDITSC Extent of agreement that the audit has a positive 
effect on the company’s credit rating score 
Positive H5 
EDUCATN Whether the respondent has a degree, 
professional/vocational qualification or has studied 
or trained in business/ management subjects 
Positive H6 
FAMILY Whether the company is wholly family-owned Negative H7 
EXOWNERS Whether the company has shareholders without 
access to internal financial information 
Positive H8 
BANK Whether the statutory accounts are given to the 
bank and other providers of finance 
Positive H9 
 
Table 3 describes the variables in the analysis and provides descriptive statistics where 
appropriate.
10
 
 
Table 3 Demand for a voluntary audit: Descriptive statistics 
 
Label Data Coding N Min Max Mean SD 
VOLAUDIT Nominal (1 = yes, 0 = no) 772 0 1 N/A N/A 
TOVER Ratio (£k) 790 .05 4738.27 691.07 1119.45 
CHECK Ordinal (5 = agree, 1 = disagree) 697 1 5 4.05 1.19 
QUALITY Ordinal (5 = agree, 1 = disagree) 687 1 5 3.35 1.38 
CREDIBLY Ordinal (5 = agree, 1 = disagree) 688 1 5 3.95 1.18 
CREDITSC Ordinal (5 = agree, 1 = disagree) 681 1 5 3.55 1.29 
EDUCATN Nominal (1 = yes, 0 = no) 790 0 1 N/A N/A 
FAMILY Nominal (1 = yes, 0 = no) 785 0 1 N/A N/A 
EXOWNERS Nominal (1 = yes, 0 = no) 722 0 1 N/A N/A 
BANK Nominal (1 = yes, 0 = no) 790 0 1 N/A N/A 
 
VOLAUDIT is the dependent variable in the analysis (Question 14 in the questionnaire) 
and consists of two groups.  The first group consists of cases where the directors would 
choose a voluntary audit and these companies were coded 1.  The second group consisted 
of cases where the directors would not have a voluntary audit and these companies were 
coded 0.  Non-responses were excluded. 
 
TOVER measures turnover (the key size measure in UK law for audit exemption), as 
disclosed in the 2002 statutory accounts.  It is used to test H1 and is expected to be 
positively associated with the demand for the audit. 
 
                                               
10 Strictly speaking, the mean cannot be calculated for ordinal data, since the numeric scale represents 
ranked nominal categories.  It is given here as an indication rather than a measure of central tendency.  The 
multivariate statistics were based on ranked data. 
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CHECK, QUALITY, CREDIBLY and CREDITSC represent management factors and are 
used to text H2 – H5.  They capture whether the directors perceive the audit as providing 
a check on accounting records and systems, improving the quality or the credibility of the 
financial information and having a positive effect on the company’s credit rating score 
(Questions 15a, 15c, 15d and 15h respectively).  These variables are expected to be 
positively associated with the demand for the audit. They are coded on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 5 = agree and 1 = disagree with the statement.  Non-responses were excluded. 
 
EDUCATN also represents management factors and is a proxy for the directors’ 
knowledge of the costs and benefits of the audit (Question 23).  It is used to test H6 and is 
a dummy variable that is expected to be positively associated with the demand for the 
audit.  It is coded 1 if the respondent has a degree, professional/vocational qualification or 
has studied or trained in business/management subjects, and 0 if not. 
 
FAMILY represents agency relationships with shareholders and captures whether the 
company is wholly family-owned (Question 1).  It is used to test H7 and is expected to be 
negatively associated with the demand for the audit.  It is a dummy variable that is coded 
1 if the company is wholly family-owned and 0 if not.  Non-responses were excluded. 
 
EXOWNERS also represent agency relationships with shareholders and captures whether 
there are external shareholders (Question 3).  It is a dummy variable that is used to test 
H8 and is expected to be positively associated with the demand for the audit. It is coded 1 
if there are shareholders without access to internal financial information and 0 if not.  
Non-responses were excluded. 
 
BANK represents agency relationships with lenders and captures whether the statutory 
accounts are given to the bank and other providers of finance (Question 18).  It is a 
dummy variable that is used to test H9 and is expected to be positively associated with the 
demand for the audit.  It is coded 1 if the company gives the statutory accounts to the 
bank and other providers of finance and 0 if not. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
 
4.1 Univariate and bivariate analysis 
 
In 74% of companies, all the shareholders had access to internal financial information, 
which implies that the majority of companies were owner-managed; in 68% of cases the 
company was wholly family-owned. 
 
A large proportion of companies (44%) had external funding in addition to the capital 
invested by the shareholders and retained profit.  The most widely used source of external 
finance was the bank (69%) and 51% of the sample give a copy of the statutory accounts 
to the bank and other providers of finance.  This is supported by the finding that the main 
users requesting the accounts to be audited in 2002 were the bank and other providers of 
finance (27%) and the shareholders. 
 
Using a maximum turnover of £1m as a proxy for eligibility, analysis of their 2002 
accounts on FAME showed that 58% of companies of this size took up audit exemption, 
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compared with 42% who did not.  The main reason given for not having the accounts 
audited was lower accountancy fees, but very few directors were able to provide details of 
the specific amount saved.  Of those that did, the typical reduction was £1,000, which 
would appear to be valid as it matches the typical audit fee disclosed in the 2002 
accounts. 
 
The proposal to raise the audit exemption threshold to £4.8m was supported by 57% of 
the sample, whilst 35% believed that it should remain at £1m.  The directors were divided 
on the question of whether they would have the accounts audited if there was no legal 
obligation to do so, with 56% intending to forgo the audit and 42% predicting that they 
would have a voluntary audit
11
 (2% did not respond).  There are some reservations on 
basing an analysis on predicted behaviour, but in this case it can be justified, as the 
directors’ forecasts are almost identical to their decisions in the 2002 accounts.  
 
4.2 Preliminary tests 
 
Mann-Whitney tests of difference were conducted to establish the independence of the 
two groups in the dependent variable VOLAUDIT (those that would have a voluntary 
audit and those that would not) and the variables measured on a non-parametric ratio 
scale (TOVER) or ordinal scale (CHECK, QUALITY, CREDIBLY, CREDITSC).  Table 
4 shows the results. 
 
Table 4 Demand for a voluntary audit: Mann-Whitney tests 
(non-parametric ratio and ordinal variables) 
 
Variable VOLAUDIT N Mean 
rank 
Sum of 
ranks 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Wilcoxon 
W 
Z p 
TOVER 0 No 438 311.29 136344.50     
 1 Yes 334 485.13 162033.50     
 Total 772   40203.50 136344.50 -10.731 .000 
CHECK 0 No 362 285.45 103332.00     
 1 Yes 320 404.91 129571.00     
 Total 682   37629.00 103332.00   -8.519 .000 
QUALITY 0 No 356 268.62   95629.00     
 1 Yes 316 412.97 130499.00     
 Total 672   32083.00   95629.00   -9.864 .000 
CREDIBLY 0 No 358 278.17   99584.00     
 1 Yes 315 403.86 127217.00     
 Total 673   35323.00   99584.00   -8.851 .000 
CREDITSC 0 No 355 273.52   97100.00     
 1 Yes 312 402.81 125678.00     
 Total 667   33910.00   97100.00   -8.928 .000 
 
The low values of the probability statistics in Table 4 provide evidence of a significant 
difference between the two groups in each test (p  0.05) and therefore these independent 
variables are included in the regression model. 
 
Chi-square tests were used to measure the association between the two groups in the 
dependent variable (VOLAUDIT) and each of the independent variables measured on a 
                                               
11
 If the threshold were raised to £4.8m, 79% of companies that are likely to be eligible for the first time 
predicted that they would not take up exemption, but would have a voluntary audit. 
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dichotomous nominal scale (FAMILY, EXOWNERS, BANK, EDUCATN).  Table 5 
shows the results. 
 
Table 5 Demand for a voluntary audit: Chi-square tests 
(nominal variables) 
 
Variable  VOLAUDIT 
0 No      1 Yes 
N Chi-square df p 
FAMILY 0 No 102 144 246    
 1 Yes 331 190 521    
 Total 433 334 767 33.103 1 .000 
EXOWNERS 0 No 351 235 586    
 1 Yes   47   73 120    
 Total 398 308 706 17.406 1 .000 
BANK 0 No 264 116 380    
 1 Yes 174 218 392    
 Total 438 334 772 49.468 1 .000 
EDUCATN 0 No 124 105 229    
 1 Yes 314 229 543    
 Total 438 334 772     .888 1 .346 
 
The probability statistics in Table 5 provide evidence of a significant positive association 
between the two groups in the dependent variable (VOLAUDIT) and the two categories 
in the independent variables FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK (p  0.05).  Therefore, 
these three variables can also be included in the regression model.  However, the result 
for EDUCATN is non-significant (p > 0.05).  This provides evidence to reject H6, as 
there is no significant difference between the audit decision and the educational profile of 
the directors. 
 
4.3 Regression model 
 
The logistic regression model tests the remaining hypotheses H1 – H5 and H7 – H9 and 
Table 6 presents the results. 
 
Table 6 Demand for a voluntary audit: Logistic regression 
 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
TOVER    .001 .000 22.970 1 .000 1.001 
CHECK    .258 .122   4.437 1 .035 1.294 
QUALITY    .393 .103 14.664 1 .000 1.482 
CREDIBLY    .137 .127   1.170 1 .279 1.147 
CREDITSC    .245 .096   6.486 1 .011 1.277 
FAMILY   -.789 .212 13.777 1 .000   .455 
EXOWNERS    .660 .268   6.084 1 .014 1.935 
BANK    .445 .216   4.235 1 .040 1.560 
Constant -4.176 .550 57.758 1 .000   .015 
 
Notes: N = 599 
Model summary: Chi-square 209.874; df 8; p < 0.01; -2 log likelihood 618.912; pseudo R2 .394 
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Table 6 shows that the probability statistic for CREDIBLY is non-significant (p > 0.05).  
This provides evidence to reject H4, as the result means the audit decision is not 
significantly influenced by the view that the audit improves the credibility of the financial 
information.  However, the results for TOVER, CHECK, QUALITY, CREDITSC, 
FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK are significant (p  0.05).  Moreover, the factor 
coefficient (B) for FAMILY indicates the expected negative relationship with the demand 
for the audit.  Therefore, there is evidence to accept H1 – H3, H5 and H7 – H9. 
 
Thus, the results show that the directors are likely to have a voluntary audit if the 
company has the following characteristics: 
 
 It is larger in terms of turnover and the directors consider the audit provides a check 
on accounting records and systems, improves the quality of the financial information 
and has a positive effect on the credit rating score; and 
 it is not wholly family-owned (ie there are non-family shareholders) and has 
shareholders without access to internal financial information; and 
 the directors normally give a copy of the statutory accounts to the bank and other 
providers of finance. 
 
The pseudo R
2
 shown in the notes below Table 6 indicates that the independent variables 
in the regression model explain 39% of the demand for the audit.  The high values of the 
Wald statistics and the low values of the probability statistics for TOVER, QUALITY and 
FAMILY compared with the other variables, indicate that turnover, perceptions that the 
audit improves the quality of the information and the existence of non-family 
shareholders are the most influential variables in the model. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 
5.1 General contribution 
 
This logistic regression study of the factors that influence the decision to have a voluntary 
audit in small companies in the UK is based on research commissioned by the DTI.  It is 
appropriate that the study has investigated the views of the directors, as they are the main 
users of the accounts (Page, 1984; Carsberg et al., 1985; Barker and Noonan, 1996) and 
use them for a range of internal and external purposes (Collis and Jarvis, 2000).  They 
also bear the cost of the audit. 
 
The selection method and number of responses allow the findings of this study to be 
generalised to other active, independent, private limited companies filing full accounts 
with a maximum turnover of £4.8m and balance sheet total up to £2.4m.  However, one 
limitation of the study is that the respondents did not fully represent companies at the 
lower end of the scale in terms of numbers of employees. 
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5.2 Discussion 
 
The results show that if the audit exemption threshold is raised to a maximum turnover of 
£4.8m, the directors of companies of this size will be divided in their views.  This 
confirms the finding of previous research by the author (Collis et al., 2001b), which 
shows that companies fall into two distinct groups with differing needs. 
 
Although 57% support the proposal to raise the threshold to £4.8m, 42% of companies of 
this size see sufficient benefits in having their accounts audited that they would choose to 
have a voluntary audit.  The validity of this prediction is strengthened by the fact that this 
matches the proportion of currently eligible companies (those with a maximum turnover 
of £1m) that chose a voluntary audit of their 2002 accounts. 
 
The results of logistic regression analysis reveal that the likelihood of the directors 
choosing a voluntary audit is higher if the company is larger in terms of turnover and they 
consider the audit provides a check on accounting records and systems, improves the 
quality of the financial information and has a positive effect on the company’s credit 
rating score; in addition, if the company is not wholly family-owned, has shareholders 
without access to internal financial information and if the statutory accounts are normally 
given to the bank and other providers of finance. 
 
Turnover represents the cost burden in the model.  Thus, the larger the turnover, the lower 
the relative cost.  To some extent, it can be argued that turnover also captures whether the 
company is large enough to have external or non-family shareholders and external 
borrowings.  However, these factors are better explained by the theory that the directors 
are willing to bear the cost of the audit because of their beliefs about the net benefits to 
the company and the role the audited accounts play in reducing the cost of capital and 
supporting agency relationships with shareholder and providers of finance where there is 
information asymmetry. 
 
These findings extend earlier research (Collis and Jarvis, 2000; Collis et al., 2001b; 
Collis, 2003b) which examined the views of the directors of slightly smaller companies 
(maximum turnover £4.2m) in 1999.  Two additional influences on the audit decision are 
identified by the present study.  These relate to beliefs about the beneficial effect of the 
audit on the company’s credit rating score and its role in providing assurance to 
shareholders without access to internal financial information. 
 
5.3 Implications 
 
The findings of this study should be of interest to the regulators, the accountancy 
profession, those who advise small companies, academics and the owners and directors of 
small companies themselves.   
 
If the higher EU maxima are adopted for defining a small company in the UK, most 
companies of a similar size to those in this study will be free to choose whether or not to 
have the accounts audited.  Among those that would be eligible to choose for the first 
time, it is likely that the vast majority (79% is the proportion suggested by this study) will 
choose a voluntary audit, on the basis that the benefits to the company outweigh the costs.  
This will be reassuring to small practitioners who rely on audit fee income from small 
company clients.  It will also be reassuring to banks, lenders and other providers of credit 
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who rely on the audited financial statements for assessing and/or monitoring risk.  
However, these parties have the economic power to ensure that their needs are met and it 
is important that future regulation continues to protect the needs of the shareholders 
requiring the additional assurance of an external audit. 
 
The findings of this study provide evidence that size is not a sufficient measure on its own 
for capturing the costs and benefits of the audit.  There are other qualitative factors.  If 
thresholds are raised to EU levels, policy makers should be aware that the new category 
of small companies would contain two subgroups with differing needs.  This is 
demonstrated by the significant proportion of directors whose audit decisions indicate that 
the benefits outweigh the costs.  This heterogeneity should also be taken into account by 
those who contribute to the development of differential reporting on the basis of size at 
the international level. 
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Appendix 
Extract of questionnaire showing variables analysed 
 
 
1. Is the company a family-owned business? (Tick one box only) 
Wholly family-owned  (1) 
Partly family-owned  (2) 
None of the shareholders are related  (0) 
 
3. How many shareholders (owners) does the company have? 
(a) Total number of shareholders   
     Breakdown:   
(b) Number of shareholders with access to internal financial information   
(c) Number of shareholders without access to internal financial information   
 
11. If the statutory accounts were not audited last year but were audited previously, have overall 
accountancy costs decreased? 
No  (0) 
Yes, by approximately                                                                                                     £         
 
13. Do you think the turnover threshold for exemption from the statutory audit should be increased 
from £1m to £4.8m? 
(Tick one box only) 
Yes, increase to £4.8m  (1) 
No, stay at £1m  (0) 
Other                                                                                                                             £m         
 
14. Would you have the accounts audited even if the company were not legally required to do so? 
(Tick one box only) 
Yes, the accounts are already audited voluntarily  (1) 
Yes, the accounts would be audited voluntarily  (2) 
No  (0) 
 
Please give reasons for either answer 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………….……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
15. What are your views on the following statements regarding the audit? 
(Circle the number closest to your view) 
 Agree                                           Disagree 
(a) Provides a check on accounting records and systems 5 4 3 2 1 
(b) Helps protect against fraud 5 4 3 2 1 
(c) Improves the quality of the financial information 5 4 3 2 1 
(d) Improves the credibility of the financial information 5 4 3 2 1 
(e) Provides assurance to shareholders 5 4 3 2 1 
(f) Provides assurance to the bank and other lenders 5 4 3 2 1 
(g) Provides assurance to suppliers and trade creditors 5 4 3 2 1 
(h) Has a positive effect on company’s credit rating score 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (please state) 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………….……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
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18. Apart from Companies House, who normally receives a copy of the company’s statutory 
accounts? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Shareholders   
(b) Bank and other providers of finance   
(c) Directors/managers who are not shareholders   
(d) Employees who are not shareholders   
(e) Major suppliers and trade creditors   
(f) Major customers   
(g) Inland Revenue   
Other (please state)   
 
............................................................................................................................. .............. 
  
 
19. If the accounts were audited last year, is it because any of the following users requested it? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Shareholders   
(b) Bank and other providers of finance   
(c) Major suppliers and trade creditors   
(d) Major customers   
(e) Inland Revenue   
Other (please state)   
 
.................................................................................................................................. ......... 
  
 
20. Apart from capital invested by the shareholders and retained profit, is the company currently 
financed by any of the following? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Personal loans from family or friends.   
(b) Bank finance   
(c) Business angel capital   
(d) Venture capital   
(e) Leasing   
(f) Hire purchase   
(g) Factoring   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
22. What is your position in the company? 
(Tick one box only) 
The sole director  (1) 
The principal director (eg managing director or chief executive)  (2) 
The finance director   (3) 
Other (please state)   
 
............................................................................................................................. .............. 
  
 
23. Do you have any of the following qualifications/training? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Undergraduate or postgraduate degree   
(b) Professional/vocational qualification   
(c) Study/training in business or management subjects   
 
 
 
